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Costs of Refugee Admission and The Ethics of Extraterritorial Protection 
 
Accepted manuscript forthcoming in The European Journal of Political Theory 
Most liberal democratic states attempt to off-load their responsibilities to admit refugees by 
pursuing H[WUDWHUULWRULDOSROLFLHV$XVWUDOLD¶VRIIVKRUHGHWHQWLRQDQGSURFHVVLQJ of asylum-seekers, 
the EU deal with Turkey and the latest moves from EU policy-makers to equip Libya and Tunisia 
with means to pull-back, and possibly process, migrants and refugees, are all examples of such 
extraterritorial policies (e.g. Collett, 2017). 7KHVHSROLFLHVUHVWULFWUHIXJHHV¶DFFHVVWRprotection 
and place many people in extremely precarious situations. Yet they seem to be a persistent 
circumstance of our contemporary non-ideal world. Is it permissible for states to limit refugee 
admissions in this way?  
*LYHQWKHSHUVLVWHQFHRIVWDWHV¶QRQ-compliance with their supposed moral duty to admit refugees 
to their territory, and the urgency of providing protection for millions of refugees, I argue that 
states are permitted to limit the number of refugees they admit if they compensate by contributing 
to protection in a third country through bilateral or multilateral agreements. The protection 
provided in the third country must be substantial, which means that it must allow for integration 
and not just basic rights. I argue that extraterritorial protection must also reflect the costs that 
VWDWHV¶EHDUIRUDGPLWWLQJUHIXJHHVWRWKHLUWHUULWRU\/RZFRVWVRIUHIXJHHDGPLVVLRQimpose a duty 
to make high contributions extraterritorially, and vice versa. 
The questions this paper address emerge from certain non-ideal conditions, by which affluent, 
Western states admit fewer refugees than they ought to, to the detriment of the provision of refugee 
protection globally.1 There are at least three important reasons to interrogate the ethics of 
extraterritorial protection in such a non-ideal word. Firstly, the urgency of providing protection for 
PLOOLRQVRIUHIXJHHVLVDUJXDEO\SDUDPRXQWWRGHYHORSLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWSHUIHFWO\PDSVWDWHV¶
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duties of justice. If extraterritorial protection can increase the overall provision of protection 
globally, then at least in the short term it appears preferable to the status quo. Secondly, given the 
ferocity with which Western states do in fact pursue extraterritorial policies, there is an alarming 
gap in our ethical understanding of the conditions that may make such policies more or less 
acceptable. Thirdly, many states prefer to discharge their duties to refugees outside of their territory 
and many scholars do acknowledge that they may have a right to do so (Miller, 2016; Wellman, 
2016; Owen, 2016). Yet little scholarly attention has been paid to the questions of when and how 
they are permitted to do so. Thus whilst much of the scholarly literature grants states the right to 
engage in extraterritorial policies, it does not specify under what conditions or what the 
LPSOLFDWLRQVDUHIRUVWDWHV¶RYHUDOOGXWLHVWRUHIXJHHV 
The methodological approach of this paper, which starts from non-ideal conditions, is useful to 
asses and improve existing institutions for which complete overhaul is unrealistic in the short-term 
(cf. Carens, 2015: 11). From an advocacy point of view, this also provides tools for assessing 
current state practices that are far from ideal, but which may nonetheless differ quite substantially 
in their ethical acceptability. I take both the non-compliance of Western states with their duties to 
admit and protect refugees, as well as their asserted right to exclude migrants in general, as givens, 
but I am conscious throughout that this approach must not lead to the entrenchment of the unjust 
institutions and practices it takes as background constraints.  
The paper starts by asking why there is an obligation to refugees, followed by the question of what 
constitutes protection. Next, I ask how such protection might be offered. Given that protection can 
EHSURYLGHGERWKE\DGPLWWLQJUHIXJHHVWRDVWDWH¶VWHUULWRU\DQGE\FRQWULEXWLQJWRSURWHFWLRQLQD
third country, I argue that the lower the FRVWVRIDGPLWWLQJUHIXJHHVWRDVWDWH¶VWHUULWRU\ are, the 
higher its extraterritorial contributions must be, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Lastly, I 
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illustrate this approach of trading costs of admission against extraterritorial contributions by 
discussing what kind of costs may count in two areas where admitting refugees is often seen as 
incurring high costs to the hosting state: self-determination and equality. 
Why is there an obligation to protect refugees? 
This paper does not intend to settle the question of why there is an obligation to protect refugees, 
but only to argue that affluent states have obligations towards a vast number of refugees that mostly 
exceed the number that they currently host by a large margin. It is likely that VWDWHV¶obligations 
towards refugees have several moral sources and four are considered below, which all provide 
plausible explanation of why states have extensive obligations towards refugees. It is not necessary 
for the argument pursued here to side with any of these accounts, as the main questions considered 
here concern how duties are discharged, rather than what their moral foundation is.  
Firstly, some scholars argue that states have a collective responsibility to protect refugees that 
emerge from the humanitarian duty to protect human rights (Miller, 2016: 83; Gibney, 2004). 
Because the refugee¶VVWDWHRIRULJLQ has failed to protect his or her human rights, this responsibility 
now falls on all other states collectively. Secondly, David Owen (2016) pursues an argument that 
also entails collective responsibility of states to protect refugees, but he argues that the moral 
foundation of such responsibility is to repair the legitimacy of the international order of states, 
which is damaged E\WKHH[LVWHQFHRIUHIXJHHV$FFRUGLQJWR2ZHQ¶VDFFRXQWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
order of states, which bestows sovereign states with legitimacy, assumes that human rights will be 
protected for all individuals. The existence of refugees demonstrates that this is not the case and 
states therefore need to protect all refugees to repair this legitimacy damage, or their own 
legitimacy as sovereign states will also be damaged. Thirdly, Joseph Carens (1992b: 39) has 
suggested that the so called non-arrival policies implemented to prevent access to asylum establish 
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a moral connection between the state implementing them and refugees who are denied protection 
as a consequence. These non-arrival policies include, for example, vLVDUHTXLUHPHQWVµSXVK-EDFNV¶
at sea and carrier sanctions. Thus, these policies create special obligations for states that use them 
to eschew responsibilities towards refugees. Lastly, states may have a special set of obligations to 
refugees from conflict areas where they have been involved in creating the conflict, such as the 
UK in the case of Iraq (Souter, 2014; Walzer, 1983: 49).  
What constitutes protection? 
On all accounts presented briefly above, responsibilities to refugees are extensive. On some 
accounts, duties amount to protecting all refugees collectively. On others, duties encompass a 
special set of refugees based on the existence of non-arrival policies and military involvement in 
refugees producing regions. Since both such activities are widespread, duties to protect refugees 
even on these more limited accounts around bound to be extensive. But what does refugee 
protection consist of? 
Many scholars argue that the main claim that refugees can make is that their human rights should 
be protected (Miller, 2015; Betts and Collier, 2017; Owen, 2016; Ferracioli 2016). For example, 
David Miller (2015: 5) argues that  
>WKH VFRSH RI WKH UHIXJHH¶V FODLP@ LV OLPLWHG WRZKDWHYHU LV QHFHVVDU\ WR SURWHFW KHU
human rights. It does not extend in any immediate way to the full set of rights and 
opportunities that a state may make available to its own citizens. 
Yet this conceptualisation of refugee protection is inadequate, as it fails to consider the harm or 
displacement. Matthew Gibney (2015: 13) suggeVWVWKDWUHIXJHHVDUHGHSULYHGRIWKHLUµVLWXDWHG
VHOI¶E\YLUWXHRIWKHLUdisplacement:  
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What exactly are the harms associated with being made a refugee? To be a refugee is 
not simply to be an individual who has lost the protection of her basic rights; it is to be 
someone deprived of her social world. It is to be someone who has been displaced from 
WKHFRPPXQLWLHVDVVRFLDWLRQVUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGFXOWXUDOFRQWH[WWKDWKDYHVKDSHGRQH¶V
LGHQWLW\DQGDURXQGZKLFKRQH¶VOLIHSODQKDVKLWKHUWREHHQRUJDQLVHG 
Others have pointed out in relation to the importance of place and territory, that feeling at home 
somewhere, and feeling secure there, is crucial to living a meaningful and autonomous life (Stilz, 
2011; cf. Moore, 2015; Nine, 2016). This is because all meaningful human activity ± all 
relationships, plans and projects ± depend on a specific place. To not have a secure place on earth 
from which activities can take place therefore comprises of a grave form of harm. Refugee 
protection, at least that which is anticipated to last in the long-term, must therefore include the 
possibility of being integrated in a political community where the person who has fled is able to 
build a social world that subsequently allows for an autonomous life: a life where plans, 
relationships and projects are possible and feel meaningful because they are connected to a social 
context. The reason why having a secure place is linked to being integrated in a political 
community is because it is such a community, or a state, that structures the impact place has on 
VRPHRQH¶V OLIH 7KLV LV encapsulated LQ -RVHSK &DUHQV¶  - DFFRXQW RI µVRFLDO
PHPEHUVKLS¶&DUHQV-QRWHVWKDWµ>ZH@DUHHPERGLHGFUHDWXUHV0RVWRIRXUDFWLYLWLHV 
take place within some physical space. In the modern world, the physical spaces in which people 
OLYHDUHRUJDQL]HGSROLWLFDOO\SULPDULO\DVWHUULWRULHVJRYHUQHGE\VWDWHV¶7KLVPHDQVKHJRHVRQ
when describing the case of a newborn child, that the state µLQHYLWDEO\VWUXFWXUHV VHFXUHV DQG
SURPRWHVKHUUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKRWKHUKXPDQEHLQJVLQFOXGLQJKHUIDPLO\LQYDULRXVZD\V¶2QH¶V
social context, in other words, is intimately related to the state that structures it. To feel secure in 
6 
 
RQH¶VSK\VLFDOplace in terms of having a social context implies that one must be able to participate 
in most areas of the political community that structures space. This may not immediately mean 
citizenship, but at least access to some social rights that allows a person to interact with her social 
context without marginalisation or stigmatisation.  
This precludes that refugee protection is reduced to mere existence in refugee camps or in states 
where refugees enjoy minimal support or rights.2 ,QGHHGVXFKµSURWHFWLRQ¶PD\QRWEHDFFHSWDEOH
on human rights accounts of refugee protection either, especially not on extensive understandings 
of human rights. It also precludes most forms of temporary protection, as this hampers the ability 
to make plans and form meaningful long-term relationships, which is not normally recognised 
when only considering human rights. Protection must, as a minimum, include rights to work, rights 
to family life and rights to education for children, but because of the importance of a secure space 
for human activity, protection must, apart from in the very short-term, be durable. This means that 
it must include the possibility to integrate fully in a new state, eventually through naturalisation, 
though it may be permissible for states to regulate this access through time criteria and/or 
citizenship tests. Alexander Betts and Paul Collier (2017) has argued that the refugee system needs 
to be transformed in a way that provides refugees with autonomy. Yet by autonomy, they mainly 
mean economic freedoms; the ability to be self-sufficient. What theories of territory and space 
teach us is that to be fully autonomous, human beings require a secure space from which activities 
can gain meaning. Having economic rights is surely important, but if protection is temporary and 
does not include the possibility of full integration, economic self-sufficiency alone does not enable 
an autonomous life.3  
How can protection be offered? 
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Establishing that states have wide ranging obligations to protect refugees and that such protection 
constitutes integration into a new state does not tell us, however, how these obligations are to be 
discharged. From the viewpoint of a state, refugee protection can be offered either by admitting 
refugees to settlHDQGLQWHJUDWHRQWKHVWDWH¶VWHUULWRU\RUE\FRQWULEXWLQJWRSURWHFWLRQLQDWKLUG
country. Whilst many scholars acknowledge that these options exist (e.g. Miller, 2015; Wellman, 
2016; Owen, 2016), there is a lack of understanding of when and how a state can discharge its 
obligations extraterritorially. Given non-ideal circumstances, I argue that a) provided that 
protection is provided in accordance to the standards of integration outlined above, and b) an 
agreement exists with a third state, states are permitted to discharge their duties in both these ways. 
The costs, in the senses I specify below, states bear for admitting refugees regulate the extent to 
which they must also contribute extraterritorially, and vice versa.  
To elaborate, various forms of burden-sharing schemes have been proposed in order to 
µdisassociate the site of arrival from the place of asylum¶+DWKDZD\DQG1HYH145). By 
allowing the relocation and resettlement of refugees, states can discharge their duties through 
collective agreements. Yet when considering the responsibility states have towards refugees, most 
theorists are concerned with the number of refugees a state has the capacity to admit for settlement 
(e.g. Gibney, 2015: 10). Miller (2016:  92) argues, for example, that states can determine how 
many refugees they should admit on the same basis as they determine general immigration targets. 
However, he also argues that states can discharge their duties towards refugees in ways other than 
admitting them to their territories (Miller, 2016: 86; 2015: 6). To reconcile these claims, we need 
WR UHFRJQLVH WKDW VWDWHV¶ obligations towards refugees need to be distinguished from how they 
discharge of those obligations. This is important, as Western states increasingly seek to discharge 
of their duties extraterritorially, yet the conditions under which this is permissible have not been 
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systematically considered. Because of the focus on discharging duties in this paper, I assume that 
VWDWHV¶RYHUDOOREOLJDWLRQVWRZDUGVUHIXJHHVFDQEHHVWDEOLVKHGYLDRQHRUDFRPELQDWLRQRIWKH
theories presented above. This overall scope of obligations remains constant, unless any of the 
reasons that it was established change, such as the creating of special responsibilities due to for 
example military involvement. This is important, because extraterritorial policies are often pursued 
to eschew responsibilities to refugees and it is not acceptable to diminish a duty one holds by 
discharging it in a certain way. The way these obligations are discharged, however, can vary. I 
suggest that the higher the costs states have for admitting refugees to settle on their territory, 
offering protection according to the standards discussed above, the lower their extraterritorial 
obligations are and vice versa. This approach is summarised in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 here.  
The advantage of this approach is that it specifies when states extraterritorial policies can be 
acceptable. Below, I will elaborate what counts as high or low costs of refugee admission, which 
creates a framework for assessing stateV¶ H[WUDWHUULWRULDO SROLFLHV. I argue that extraterritorial 
SROLFLHVDUHDFFHSWDEOHZKHQWKH\UHIOHFWVWDWHV¶FRVWVRIUHIXJHHDGPLVVLRQ,IVWDWHVEHDUORZFRVWV
for admission and extraterritorial policies, they are not fulfilling their duties to refugees. In 
addition, I outline two conditions of permissible extraterritorial protection, which enable us to 
assess how states are permitted to discharge duties extraterritorially. Whilst it may be argued that, 
ideally, states would be willing to admit all refugees who sought asylum on their soil, the approach 
developed here provides a more fine-tuned moral framework for assessing state practices under 
non-ideal conditions. Even those holding that there is something morally important about states 
accepting refugees who apply for asylum on their territory may accept that states can be permitted 
to discharge their duties to refugees in a third state if it would lead to more refugees gaining 
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protection overall. And if that is the case, then it is necessary to understand under what conditions 
that is permissible.  
The two conditions that need to be in place for a state to discharge their duties in a third country 
imply that the approach developed here is a far cry away from those advocating that European 
states only admit very few refugees and that most efforts should instead be redirected to 
extraterritorial processing or to refugee camps in countries neighbouring conflict areas (e.g. 
Goodhart, 2016). The two conditions that must be met by the state that wants to discharge its duties 
in a third country are: a) the protection offered allows refugees to integrate, b) an agreement with 
a third country exists. Firstly, the protection that is being offered in the third state must accord with 
the standards outlined above, which include the ability to fully integrate in a new society so that 
meaningful human activity can resume. This consequently rules out many contemporary forms of 
extraterritorial refugee protection, which often only amount to providing (insufficient) funding of 
UHIXJHHFDPSV,WDOVRUXOHVRXWUHFHQWVXJJHVWLRQVRIWKHFUHDWLRQRIVRFDOOHG³HFRQRPLF]RQHV´
where refugees can work without becoming part of the host society (Betts and Collier, 2017). 
Protection must ultimately be durable and humane, and this means that it must allow for full 
integration in a new society unless immanent return to the country of origin is feasible and 
desirable to the refugee. This is the case regardless of where protection takes place ± whether in 
an affluent state it in a third state that the affluent state is paying to provide protection.  
Secondly, if no third countries are willing to admit refugees, then it is not possible for a state to 
discharge its duties outside its territory and these duties consequently must be discharged within 
WKHVWDWH¶VRZQWHUULWRU\ For a state to be discharging its duties by compensating a third country, 
this must be settled through bilateral or multilateral agreement, rather than by unilateral policies. 
Currently, poorer states take a much larger number of refugees because more affluent states 
10 
 
implement non-arrival policies that actively prevent refugees from accessing their territories (cf. 
UNHCR, 2016: 15). Even if they do provide economic support to those poorer hosting states, it is 
not as a result of a bilateral agreement, but as a result of coercive, unilateral policies. To count as 
discharging duties, rather than avoidance, extraterritorial efforts towards refugee protection must 
follow from mutual agreements with the third countries in question. Such agreements are also 
likely to depend on the paying state agreeing to also admit some refugees. This is because less 
affluent states are unlikely to agree to host large numbers of refugees if more affluent states do not 
also host a share themselves (Betts, 2015: 8). Thus, whilst the worry that these sorts of agreements 
may be exploitative, because more affluent states are in a more powerful position, the conditions 
of the agreements suggested here would nonetheless make current arrangements far less 
exploitative compared to the status quo.   
What counts as a cost of refugee admission? 
So far, I have outlined the main claim of this paper, which is that, under non-ideal circumstances, 
states are permitted to discharge their duties to refugees extraterritorially if they can do so through 
an agreement with a third state and the protection offered allows for integration. The extent to 
which states contribute to protection extraterritorially, I have suggested, depends on what costs 
they have for admitting refugees on their territory. High costs for admission means low 
extraterritorial contributions, and vice versa. To FRQVLGHUKRZVWDWHV¶FRVWVIRUDGPLWWLQJUHIXJHHV
to settle on their territory relate to their obligations to aid refugees outside of their territory, we 
need to establish what can justifiably count as a cost of refugee admission. To be clear, like 
extraterritorial protection, such admission must amount to refugee protection according to the 
standards outlined above, allowing refugees to fully integrate. The remainder of the paper will be 
devoted to this question. The discussion focuses primarily on these immaterial costs, as these costs, 
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as opposed to economic effects, are often key factors underlying opposition to immigrants and 
refugees (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2005). However, whilst costs of admission may be both material and 
immaterial, the compensatory extraterritorial contributions will likely mainly be, but not limited 
WR ILQDQFLDO FRQWULEXWLRQV $V LQ IRU H[DPSOH WKH (87XUNH\ GHDO WKH (8¶V H[WUDWHUULWRULDO
contributions also included, although this has not been realised, access to visa-free travel for 
Turkish nationals.  
It may be argued that only the loss of basic liberties, or human rights, amongst citizens of the 
refugee hosting states can permit a state to limit the number of refugees it admits. This is because 
refugees suffer a loss of human rights and it can be argued that it is not permissible to prioritise 
the non-basic rights of citizens over the human rights of refugees (cf. Carens, 1987: 259; Abizadeh, 
2016). On this view, then, only extremely high costs to the receiving state, namely those that result 
in the loss of basic liberties for citizens, can justify restrictions (cf. Owen, 2016a: 284). The 
humanitarian accounts of obligations to refugees discussed above (Miller, 2016; Gibney, 2004), 
would find this too demanding. They hold instead that states only have an obligation to assist 
UHIXJHHVZKHQFRVWVDUHµORZ¶. Because this paper is not primarily about what obligations states 
have towards refugees, but how states discharge these duties, I will allow that the threshold for 
what counts as a maximum cost will vary depending on what account of obligations is inserted. 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHPRVWGHPDQGLQJDFFRXQWVXFKDV2ZHQ¶VDQ\FRVWVRIUHIXJHHDGPLVVLRQ
that do not involve the loss of human rights FDQQRWUHGXFHVWDWHV¶RYHUDOOREOLJDWLRQVWRUHIXJHHV
Yet what they could do, according to the approach advanced here, is to allow the state to discharge 
duties extraterritorially instead. Even in the case that basic liberties may be at stake for admission, 
it may not necessarily follow that overall obligations will alter unless basic liberties are also 
threatened were the state to provide extraterritorial assistance as well. Less demanding accounts 
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will draw the limit at a lower point, and consequently some of the high costs discussed below will 
DOVROHDGWRDQRYHUDOOUHGXFWLRQLQVWDWHV¶REOLJDWLRQVAt no point, however, can a state shun the 
principle of non-refoulement, which is the general duty to not forcibly return refugees to a place 
in which their safety is endangered. 
I limit the analysis to what constitutes costs to liberal democratic states. I suggest that costs count 
when they negatively affect interests of citizens and functions of the state that are central to the 
realisation of a liberal conceptions of justice. According to Rawls (2005: 6), a liberal political 
conception of justice, of which there are many, has three main features:  
first, a VSHFLILFDWLRQRIFHUWDLQEDVLFULJKWVOLEHUWLHVDQGRSSRUWXQLWLHV>«@VHFRQGDQ
assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties, and opportunities, especially 
with respect to claims of the general good and perfectionist values; and third, measures 
assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their 
liberties and opportunities. 
It is not my intention to argue for a specifically Rawlsian political liberalism here, and other 
approaches could be substituted (cf. Patten, 2011), but the definition above contains some basic 
tenets of egalitarian liberal justice that can be accepted by many different liberal approaches. This 
contains the priority of equal basic rights and liberties, but also the more demanding notion that 
citizens need to be able to make effective use of these, which can entail a variety of egalitarian 
approaches. Such approached generally provide citizens with some basic capabilities or goods that 
allow for citizens to use their liberties to advance opportunities. There is also a caution against 
strong perfectionism, wherein the state would advance a particular comprehensive conception of 
the good (cf. Chan, 2000). Such strong perfectionism would violate the legitimacy of the state 
based on universal justification, the notion that all who are subject to coercive political institutions 
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must in theory be able to accept them. Thus costs that do not count are costs to features of functions 
or values of the state that do not respect the equal rights and liberties of all citizens, that give 
priority to perfectionist values over such rights or do not provide all citizens with the means to 
make effective use of their liberties. For example, states cannot claim that the racial or religious 
composition of their citizenry must be preserved, and that refugee admission may constitute a cost 
LQ WKLV UHJDUG VLQFH VXFK FODLPV DUH QRW FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK HYHU\RQH¶V HTXDO OLEHUWLHV DQG
opportunities. To be clear, these costs are disqualified not because they violate the rights of 
refugees, but because they are incompatible with a liberal conception of justice. The arguments 
pursued in this paper are meant to be applicable to liberal democracies, hence they cannot appeal 
to illiberal values to alter their duties to refugees. Costs to the two values that are discussed in this 
paper, collective self-determination and equality, may count, since both refer to ways in which 
citizens can use their liberties effectively, as explained below.  
Costs may also be direct or indirect and high or low and this may not solely relate to their impact 
on the function or value that is worth protecting. One aspect of the assessment of costs, whether 
they are high or low, is the causes of costs. The cause of a cost may be related to factors that are 
circumstantial, in that individual states cannot easily control them, such as market forces or climate 
change. But costs may also be caused by things that are possible for the state and its citizens to 
control, such as their own attitudes and behaviour, and the design of institutions. What are we to 
make of these costs? It is useful to consider how these kinds of factors, factors that a duty-bearer 
can control, generally impact on duties. Justice is often argued to be conditioned on feasibility; 
µRXJKWLPSOLHVFDQ¶7KLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\WUXHRIWKHRULHVRIMXVWLFHWKDWLQWHQGWREHDFWLRQJXLGLQJ
in some regard (Mason, 2016). To have a duty of justice thus implies that one can realise that duty; 
it is feasible that the duty-bearing agent is able to discharge his duty. In terms of what is feasible, 
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we are faced with hard and soft constraints (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2009). Hard constraints 
are things we cannot control ± they are part of the human condition. In contrast, soft constrains are 
µPDOOHDEOHWRVRPHGHJUHH¶0DVRQ: WKH\DUHZLWKLQWKHDJHQW¶VFRQWUROVXFKDVIRU
example, self-motivation. Hard constraints clearly impede feasibility and therefore constitute 
costs, but what about soft constraints?  
There are two aspects to including soft constraints in the feasibility of realising a duty of justice. 
First is the time frame and the action guiding intentions of theorising about feasibility and justice 
(Mason, 2016: 52; cf. Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012: 815). If a theory of justice is to be action-
guiding, it may have to consider how some soft constraints may in fact appear like hard constraints 
in the short-term. This is a relevant consideration for the approach developed in this paper, which 
accepts certain facts about current liberal democracies such as their assumption that they have a 
right to exclude migrants from their territory, which may ultimately be unjustifiable (Author). The 
timeframe is consequently shorter and the action guiding intentions stronger, implying that some 
soft constraints may count towards the feasibility of carrying out the duty to protect refugees on a 
VWDWH¶V WHUULWRU\6HFRQGKRZHYHU VRIWFRQVWUDLQWVDOVRJLYH ULVH WR µG\QDPLFGXWLHV¶ *LODEHUW
2009: 7KHVHDUHGXWLHVWKDWLQYROYHµWKHH[SDQVLRQRIWKH IHDVLEOHVHWVRISROLWLFDODFWLRQ¶
(Gilabert, 2009: 677).  
These duties are peculiar in that they are not merely focused on what is to be done 
within certain circumstances, but also on changing certain circumstances so that new 
things can be done (Gilabert, 2009: 677). 
&RQVHTXHQWO\ VRIW FRQVWUDLQWV PD\ FRXQW WRZDUGV WKH FRVWV RI DGPLWWLQJ UHIXJHHV WR D VWDWH¶V
WHUULWRU\GHSHQGLQJRQKRZµKDUG¶WKH\DSSHDUWREHLQWKHVKRUW-term, but they are also followed 
by concomitant dynamic duties to reduce their impact on feasibility in the long-term. The 
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DVVHVVPHQW RI KRZ µKDUG¶ WKH VRIW FRQVWUDLQWV DSSHDU WR EH LQ WKH VKRUW-term depends on how 
difficult it is to control the impact of, and alter, soft constraints in the short-term. The µharder¶ they 
appear to be, the higher the costs of them are likely to be.  
Yet there is an important caveat to add to this simple formula. Determining how to count the costs 
of soft constraints is to an extent a moralised process. For some soft constraints seem to be more 
circumstantial whereas others are caused by unjustifiable attitudes. For example, a circumstantial 
soft constraint may be the lack of housing for refugees, whereas other soft constraints may result 
from in-group favouritism or prejudice, such as an increase in ethnic discrimination. It seems like 
the latter kind are not RQO\µVRIWHU¶arguably easier to change in the short-term by the individuals 
harbouring those attitudes, but also that they count as lower costs to avoid perverse incentives. To 
allow those morally problematic soft constraints to count the same as other constraints simply 
based on their impact of refugee admission would entail that the more prejudiced someone is, the 
more they are permitted to discharge their obligations to refugees outside their territory. 
Furthermore, it is LPSRUWDQWWRFODULI\LQZKDWVHQVHFLWL]HQVFDQEHµLQFRQWURO¶RUWKHLUDWWLWXGHV
Even if there is evidence to suggest, for example from research on implicit biases, that humans are 
cognitively less able to control our views than we may have hoped, it would be deeply problematic 
to infer that we are not morally responsible for our views. If the realisation of one moral duty is 
hindered by a person harbouring a set of values and attitudes that are incompatible with that duty, 
then it would be morally deterministic to argue that therefore this duty is subject to hard 
constraints.  
,Q DGGLWLRQ WR DVVHVV KRZ IHDVLELOLW\ FRQVWUDLQWV DIIHFW WKH GXW\ WR DGPLW UHIXJHHV RQ D VWDWH¶V
territory, we must first establish who the duty-bearing agent is, as that matters for the extent to 
which it is able to control and alter feasibility constraints. Primarily, the duty to protect refugees 
16 
 
falls on the state, as individual citizens do not have the capacity to provide such protection. 
Individual citizens cannot protect the rights of refugees; this is an obligation that attaches 
specifically to an agent like the state, which has capacities to protect rights. Yet the state, at least 
if it is a liberal democratic one, is not simply an external agent to the citizens it represents. When 
we speak of the democratic state as an agent, we speak to some extent about the institutions and 
officials specifically involved in governing. But we speak also of the citizenry as a whole, which 
authorises the state and its actions. Consequently, whilst it is debatable to what extent citizens 
VKDUH FROOHFWLYH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU VWDWH DFWLRQV FLWL]HQV RI GHPRFUDWLF VWDWHV DV WKH VWDWH¶V
authorising agents are at least responsible for not obstructing the state when it is carrying out its 
duties. Therefore, when assessing what feasibility constraints are soft or hard, we may count as 
soft constraints not only those that involve the design and capacities of state institutions, but also 
those that involve the attitudes and behaviour of citizens, as these are both within the control of 
the state and its authorising citizens.  
Gibney argues along these lines in relation to his humanitarian principle of refugee protection. He 
suggests that governments have a responsibility to work towards making the political conditions 
more favourable to accepting refugees: 
governments can and do play an important role in shaping the social and political 
HQYLURQPHQWLQZKLFKWKH\DUHORFDWHG>«@7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHFRQFHSWLRQRIµFRVWV¶
at the heart of humanitarianism is partly a social and political construct. If this is right, 
and we concede the moral importance of the claims of refugees, then it makes sense to 
see humanitarianism as imposing on governments an additional responsibility ± a duty 
to work towards reshaping the political space in which they find themselves in ways 
more conducive to the reception of refugees and asylum seekers (Gibney, 2004: 244).  
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Again, it is not enough to allow some contingent social realities to be part of the overall formula 
of calculating costs for refugee admission, as the impact of any actions or policies in the short-
term also affects the conditions for admission in the long-term. Even though the approach explored 
in this paper operates mainly in the short-term, and thus allows for some soft constraints on the 
ability of states to discharge their obligations towards refugees to count, different timeframes of 
justice can never be fully separated. Present actions will limit or expand the range of possible 
actions in the future. It is therefore not justifiable to refer to contingent factors that limit the range 
of possible actions in the short-term without also addressing how these factors can be altered so as 
to expand the range of possible actions in the long-term, or at least not to refer to them in a way 
that may further entrench those contingent factors. For example, in the case of a racist backlash, 
political parties that mimic xenophobic rhetoric to win back voters from xenophobic parties may 
be entrenching such sentiments and thus make the overall social conditions less favourable to 
refugee admission.  
In summary, this section has discussed what kind of costs that can permit a state to discharge their 
duties to refugees outside of their territory. Firstly, these are costs that refugee admission impose 
upon a function or value central to a liberal conception of justice. Secondly, these costs may result 
from hard constraints, in which case they are higher, or soft constraints, in which case they are 
lower. In addition, we would want to avoid creating perverse incentives, so that we do not count 
as costs, or at least not as high costs, effects of refugee admission that incentivises states to increase 
those costs to restrict refugee admission.  
Costs of Refugee Admission  
Now, let us look at what may count as costs in two areas. The discussions below serve as examples 
of how this framework of costs, limits and obligations may be applied to various areas of concern. 
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The main claim is that if states pursue extraterritorial protection policies, they must do so in a way 
that reflects the costs that they already bear, or fail to bear, for refugee admission. If the refugees 
they admit only impose a small cost, then the state must contribute substantially extraterritorially 
for such policies to be justified as an alternative to admission.  
The Capacity for Collective Self-Determination 
The right of a state to exclude immigrants in general is often defended on the grounds that control 
over borders is essential for collective self-determination (Walzer, 1983; Moore, 2015: Wellman, 
2008). Such accounts of the right to exclude normally make some exceptions for refugees, though 
they often leave it up to the state to decide on the appropriate number of refugee admissions 
(Wellman, 2016). Does protecting refugees constitute a cost to the capacity of current citizens to 
be self-determining?  
Autonomy, alienation and belonging 
)ROORZLQJ$QQD6WLO]¶Vforthcoming) distinction, the rights of refugees can be seen as claims to 
µWDNHUIUHHGRP¶EDVLFOLEHUWLHVDQGVHFXULW\ZKHUHDVFXUUHQWFLWL]HQV¶right to self-determination 
LVDFODLPWR µPDNHUIUHHGRP¶ WREH WKHDXWKRUVRI WKHFRHUFLYH LQVWLWXWLRQV WKDWDUHSURWHFWLQJ
µWDNHUIUHHGRP¶DQGJRYHUQLQJWKHLUOLYHV4 ,WLVWKLVµPDNHUIUHHGRP¶WKDWHQFDSVXODWHVDFRUHYDOXH
of self-determination as the interest in being the author of the political institutions that govern 
RQH¶V FROOHFWLYH H[LVWHQFH &ROOHFWLYH VHOI-determination is not solely a demand for political 
institutions that can guarantee popular sovereignty through democratic governance, but a demand 
for particular political institutions to serve this function. Stilz (forthcoming) suggests that these 
are institutions that citizens affirm. When citizens affirm their political institutions, they do not see 
WKHPDVµKRVWLOHFRQVWUDLQWV¶EXWLQSDUWDVµVHOI-LPSRVHG¶6WLO]forthcoming: 16). In contrast, if 
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citizens do not affirm their political institutions, but feel alienated from them, the freedom that 
self-governance bestows them with is rendered to some extent meaningless. Mason (2000: 133) 
has similarly emphasised that when citizens fail to identify with political institutions, and do not 
IHHO DW KRPH LQ WKHP WKH\ µDUH OHVV OLNHO\ WR WKLQN WKDW WKH\ KDYH D VWDNH LQ WKHLU VWDELOLW\ RU
VXUYLYDO¶ 7KXV WKURXJK DIILUPLQJ DQG LGHQWLI\LQJ ZLWK SROLtical institutions, citizens avoid the 
DOLHQDWLRQWKDWPD\RWKHUZLVHRFFXUDQGDVHQVHRIDXWKRUVKLSµPDNHUIUHHGRP¶LVLQGXFHG5   
This notion of collective self-determination is in line with common understandings of self-
determination as the absence of µDOLHQ UXOH¶ DQG , EHOLHYH H[SODLQV well the value of self-
determination as an additional value to democratic self-governance. Collective self-determination 
is a form of collective freedom from alien rule, whilst democratic self-governance is a way of 
reconciling individual freedom with political power. Making affirmation and non-alienation core 
parts of collective self-determination clarifies what is special about self-determination as an aspect 
of freedom. Indeed, this may be especially applicable to newcomers, who might feel marginalised 
from political institutions whilst being formally included and in this way be deprived of an 
important aspect freedom. This account may not appeal, however, to nationalist scholars who hold 
that collective self-determination is valuable because it enables a community to preserve its 
national identity and culture (Miller, 1995: 85). Whilst the argument below may therefore not be 
convincing to those advocating nationalism, it is worth pointing out that it may simply be unhelpful 
to talk about culture in relation to collective self-determination, as cultures do not necessarily 
overlap with self-determining groups (Moore, 2015: 80). Whilst preserving a culture may be 
important to some self-determining collectives, it fails to capture what is uniquely valuable about 
self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ:KDWUHPDLQVLPSRUWDQW LVFLWL]HQV¶SROLWLFDO LGHQWLW\ZKLFKDOORZVWKHPWR
affirm, to feel at home in political institutions and consider themselves as authors of their collective 
20 
 
existence. As collective self-determination relates to freedom in this way, costs to collective self-
determination PD\MXVWLILDEO\FRXQWWRZDUGVVWDWHV¶FRVWVRIUHIXJHHDGPLVVLRQas they relate to 
the ability of citizens to make effective use of their rights and liberties.  
Collective Agency 
What is necessary for collective self-determination in this sense to come about? Many recent 
accounts have suggested that collective self-determination requires collective agency (Moore, 
2015; Stilz, forthcoming; Buchanan, 2016). In essence, collective agency consists of the ability of 
a group to form we-intentions and to act upon them. Such intentions and actions are not reducible 
to any single individual in the group, but can only be understood in the collective sense, and 
individual group members intend to be part of a joint enterprise as plural subjects rather than as 
LQGLYLGXDOVDVDµZH¶:KDWIRUPVWKHEDVLVRIWKLVµZH¶"$FFRUGLQJWR6WLO]forthcoming: 10),  
a shared procedural commitment to a joint venture is all that is required. Political unity 
need not be grounded on shared first-order values, but can rest on a second-order 
attitude of valuing a process of political cooperation undertaken in concert with others.  
This shared commitment, akin to the idea of constitutional patriotism, can form the basis of the 
µZH¶ZKLFKFLWL]HQVLPDJLQHDVWKH\XQGHUVWDQGRWKHUVWRDIILUPSDUWLFXODUSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
:LWKRXWDVHQVHRIDµZH¶± without a shared identity ± it is not posVLEOHWRVKDUHLQWHQWLRQV6WLO]¶V
account, of course, rests on a very thin conception of political identity. Yet if the way collective 
self-determination contributes to freedom depends on how citizens are able to affirm political 
institutions and feel at home in them, it is identification with those institutions that matters, or 
µEHORQJLQJWRJHWKHUDVDSROLW\¶DV0DVRQ: 127) suggests. The necessary political identity 
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rests, therefore, on shared commitments to the joint enterprise of governing together under a 
particular set of political institutions, and not a thicker sense of identity.  
A few more conditions apply before a group can exercise collective political agency. 
Political institutions must be structured so that political representatives are accountable and 
govern according to a constitution (Stilz, forthcoming). Without constitutionalism and 
accountability, the state may be pursuing policies that do not constitute a shared intention by 
the people. They must also be legitimate, so that citizenV¶DIILUPDWLRQLVµDXWKHQWLF¶DQGQRW
corrupted by authoritarian institutions (Stilz, forthcoming; Buchanan, 2016). Lastly, in order 
to be self-GHWHUPLQLQJFLWL]HQV¶DFWLRQVPXVWEHFRRUGLQDWHGLQVXFKDZD\VRWKDWGHFLVLRQV
can be attributed to the whole group (Buchanan, 2016: 453). The following section will 
discuss how admitting refugees may constitute a cost to these conditions of collective self-
determination. 
Costs to Collective Self-Determination 
Firstly, citizens need to share a commitment, a joint intention, to shared institutions as plural 
VXEMHFWVDVDµZH¶DSROLWLFDO LGHQWLW\$VVXJJHVWHGDERYH WKLVFRQGLWLRQRIDVKDUHGSROLWLFDO
identity need only be interpreted in a minimal sense, as shared commitments to a particular set of 
political institutions, if the purpose is to avoid alienation and enable collective authorship of 
coercive institutions. The fact that thicker forms of identity may be why people do identify with 
their political institutions does not make them necessary conditions for exercising collective self-
determination, though I suggest below that they may count as soft constraints. Many theorists of 
self-determination argue that a fundamental part of what it means to be self-determining is to be 
in control over the composition DQGFKDUDFWHURIWKHµVHOI¶:DO]HU:HOOPDQ: 115). 
Being able to restrict immigration and refugees is therefore seen as an essential component of 
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collective self-determination. On the account of self-determination defended here, this is not 
neFHVVDU\:KDWPDWWHUVLVWKDWFLWL]HQVFDQLPDJLQHDµZH¶WKDWLQWKHLULQWHQWLRQWRFRQWULEXWHWR
the core political institutions of the state they understand themselves as part of a joint enterprise 
together with others who also identify with the same polity. What matters is not the capacity to 
control WKHµVHOI¶EXWWKHDELOLW\WRimagine WKHµVHOI¶6 
However, if citizens harbour a thick sense of their collective self, then this collective imagining 
may prove difficult in the face of refugee-driven divHUVLILFDWLRQ1DWLRQDOLGHQWLWLHVPD\EHµVWLFN\¶
and difficult to change in the short-term, and rapid disruptions may make citizens feel alienated 
from political institutions. Since they are within the control of the attitudes of current citizens, as 
well as the state with its nation-building tools (e.g. citizenship, education and cultural policies), 
they are soft constraints. 7KHG\QDPLFGXWLHVWKDWIROORZFRQVLVWLQXQGHUWDNLQJDµUH-LPDJLQLQJ¶
SURFHVVWRDWKLQQHULGHQWLW\VRWKDWFLWL]HQV¶FROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\GRHVQRWKLQGHUUHIXJHHDGPLVVLRQ
in the long-term. AVVXJJHVWHGRQO\µWKLQ¶IRUPVRISROLWLFDOLGHQWLW\DUHQHFHVVary for collective 
self-determination. And as contended above, determining soft and hard constraints is also a 
PRUDOLVHGHQGHDYRXUZKHUHFRQVWUDLQWVDUH µVRIWHU¶ LISHUVRQVFDQDOVREH UHJDUGHGDVPRUDOO\
blameworthy for their attitudes, even when they may be subjectively perceived as hard to change. 
This is important to avoid perverse incentives. If someone feels alienated from their political 
institutions because they hold a racialized view of their political identity, and institutions embrace 
diversity, then this person ought to change their political identity to one that is compatible with a 
liberal conception of justice and especially with the equality of all persons. Some forms of identity, 
like those based on racism, undermine other aspects of freedom and justice than µPDNHUIUHHGRP¶
they undermine the realisation of a liberal conception of justice (with or without refugee 
admission).  
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The difficulty of imagining a shared identity may also stem from refugees themselves. We may 
worry, for example, that they do not immediately affirm their new political institutions. This may 
undermine the constitutional basis of the state, which is a necessary condition of collective self-
determination, and it may undermine a political identity based on shared commitments to political 
institutions. Before addressing whether these costs may count, it is important to recognise that 
claims about the distance in values between refugees and the native population are often based on 
prejudice (Holtug et al, 2015). Moreover, the internal value consensus amongst the somewhat 
DUELWUDU\FDWHJRULHVµFLWL]HQV¶DQGµLPPLJUDQWV¶LVRIWHQH[DJJHUDWHG-XVWDVDµWKLFN¶LGHntity may 
UHTXLUH FLWL]HQV WR µUH-LPDJLQH¶ WKHPVHOYHV VR WKDW WKHLU FROOHFWLYH LPDJLQDWLRQ can incorporate 
newcomers, the way in which shared values are deliberated within a political culture may also be 
required to change to that end. Discussing the role of universal values in public deliberation in 
relation to the Danish cartoon controversy, Christian Rostbøll (2010: QRWHVWKDWµLWZDVWKH
presentation of liberal principles as inseparable from a specific history and culture that led to the 
notion thaW0XVOLPVFRXOGQRWSRVVLEO\VKDUHWKHVHSULQFLSOHV¶7KHIDLOXUHWRLPDJLQHVRPHSHRSOH
LQWKLVFDVH0XVOLPVDVSDUWRIWKHLPDJLQHGµZH¶PD\VWHPIURPZKDWWKHVKDUHGSURSHUWLHVRI
WKHµZH¶DUHSHUFHLYHGWRRULJLQDWHIURP+HQFHLQWKLVFDVHZKLOVWthis may count as a low cost, 
it is certainly possible for citizens and, especially, public officials to change their way of 
conducting public discourse in a more inclusive way. Indeed, there is already wide variation in 
how national identity and national discourse on community boundaries are understood within most 
liberal nations and there are consequently ample symbolic resources for a more inclusive discourse 
already available. There is therefore a strong onus to remove this soft constraint. 
Yet some costs may remain resulting from the different values, identities and attitudes of some 
refugees, especially if numbers are high. This can be circumvented by separating admission and 
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membership (Pevnick, 2009; Author). Commitment to political institutions can also be developed 
through integration and naturalisation policies. However, many refugees need permanent 
membership in a new state, so this can only be a partial mitigation (Gibney, 2015: 8). If a large 
majority of the admitted refugees hold radically different regime type preferences, favouring 
authoritarian or clerical regimes, then their inclusion in the citizenry may, however, constitute a 
cost to the ability to form shared intentions in the particular regard of preferences for particular 
political institutions. And these costs, though they are rarely as severe as portrayed, may indeed 
count has high, since they are beyond the immediate control of the state and of citizens, so long as 
their identity is of the thinnest possible kind. 
In summary, refugee admission may impose costs to the capacity of self-determination. But almost 
all of these costs result from soft constraints, such as costs of citizenship and integration policies, 
and some are caused by prejudiced attitudes of current citizens, such as exclusionary public 
discourses. Therefore, most only count as lower costs, especially those that are based on prejudice, 
as otherwise perverse incentives would be created. Consequently, whilst these costs to self-
determination may permit the state to pursue extraterritorial protection instead of admitting 
refugees to its territory, it will either have to provide very extensive extraterritorial protection or 
nonetheless admit a substantial number of refugees. 
Equality 
A liberal conception of justice includes some form of redistribution through a welfare state so that 
citizens can be equipped with means to make effective use of their liberties and opportunities. The 
welfare state may need additional resources as a result of very high levels of refugee admission. 
Yet many of the costs that states are reluctant to shoulder in relation to the welfare state are not 
material, but relate to the value of equality. What kind of costs are they and do they count? 
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,QDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHIDFWRUVWKDWDIIHFWDVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\WRDEVRUEUHIXJHHV*LEQH\: 216-
21) argues that the wealth of a country is an inadequate indicator of its ability to absorb refugees, 
since admitting refugees is more expensive in Western states, with expansive welfare states, than 
in less developed countries that do not include refugees in such extensive provisions of public 
goods. Many poorer countries that host a large number of refugees, such as Lebanon and Turkey, 
provide few rights to refugees and refugee admission is therefore less costly per refugee.7 A state 
with a generous welfare state and a commitment to egalitarian membership will have much higher 
costs for refugees than a state with a limited welfare state and/or no commitment to egalitarian 
membership. That is, a state may have a generous welfare state, but without a commitment to 
egalitarian membership, that all citizens or permanent residents should have equal social and 
political rights, the welfare state need not extend to refugees. The most generous welfare states, 
such as the Scandinavian ones, often have a very strong commitment to equality and extend many 
rights to residents, even sometimes if they are not permanent or even recognised by the state. To 
keep the commitment to egalitarian membership, refugees need to be fully included in the welfare 
states, which may result in high costs per refugee, in particular if they struggle to break in to the 
labour market. Can these be justifiably classed as costs?  
Liberal conceptions of justice vary, and indeed one of the reasons collective self-determination is 
valuable is that it allows citizens to implement a particular conception of justice. Because there is 
no one standard of equality by which all liberal conceptions of justice can be judged ± there can 
be reasonable disagreement on matters such as the size and design of the welfare state - it may also 
be necessary to ask of states to adjust their particular interpretation of equality to enable increased 
refugee admission. Otherwise, perverse incentives are created, whereby those states that prioritise 
their own citizens the most, and implement the strictest form of egalitarianism, also need to admit 
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fewer refugees. In general, obligations that arise between citizens of affluent states cannot 
themselves reduce their obligations to outsiders (Abizadeh, 2016; Scheffler, 2001). For if we have 
X obligations to all humans, the fact that our cooperation with A and B in a welfare state creates 
Y obligations to A and B does not alter our X obligations to all humans. Consequently, egalitarian 
states can reduce their costs of refugee admission by lowering their commitment to equality. If 
they differentiate social rights between citizens and non-citizens, or temporary residents and 
permanent residents, they can maintain a generous welfare state for citizens/permanent residents 
whilst providing a more limited set of social rights for non-citizens/temporary residents. This need 
not necessarily have detrimental effects on refugees or on the economic equality between citizens 
and refugees, depending on the extent to which rights are restricted. For example, such restrictions 
may be limited to contribution-based entitlements. Yet this way of reducing cost can only be 
temporary, as refugees must be provided the opportunity to become both permanent residents and 
citizens. 
In addition, we do not want to create an incentive for states to provide very few rights to 
immigrants, or in general develop a very limited welfare state with the argument that it allows 
them to admit more refugees. Because of this, costs to equality that count may certainly arise from 
refugee admission. Examples of these are reorganisations of the labour market and welfare state 
in such a way so that income differences will increase, or tax increases to fund the education and 
training of refugees to provide them an equal footing on the labour market.8 Material costs of 
refugee admission may however be dispersed differently across the population, which affects 
whether the costs to equality are high or low. Whether capacity-increasing measures such as 
spending cuts or tax increases are progressive or not matters for whether the value of equality has 
been affected by refugee admission. It is when the number of refugees reach a point where the 
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state must introduce capacity-increasing measures that have a regressive effect that refugee 
admission constitutes a cost to equality. At this point, it may be permitted to pursue extraterritorial 
policies instead.  
Motivational Constraints 
There is a second way in which refugee admission may constitute a cost to equality; by reducing 
popular support for redistribution. Nationalist scholars have long argued that national identity 
contributes to creating the trust and solidarity necessary to uphold the welfare state (Miller, 1995). 
Diversity, as it undermines a sense of shared national identity built around a shared culture, may 
therefore indirectly undermine equality by eroding trust and solidarity. There is some, though 
mixed and inconclusive, evidence that an increase in diversity may have such effects (Schaeffer, 
2013; Burgoon, 2014). Moreover, these effects often emerge as a result of perceived ethnic 
differences (Burgoon, 2014). This suggests that citizens are not justified in reacting in this way, as 
it amounts to ethnic discrimination and this is not compatible with a liberal egalitarian conception 
of justice. Even if these kinds of costs do affect a central feature of a liberal conception of justice, 
therefore, they appear to emerge from the unjustified attitudes of citizens. 
Accordingly, Ryan Pevnick (2009: 152) argues that µit is objectionable to allow citizens to use 
predictions about their own future behavior to rule out policies because they control their future 
behavior¶ (cf. Carens, 1992a). Whilst this is true in terms of how such soft constraints cannot alter 
the scope of obligations to protect refugees, they may still impose some feasibility constraints in 
the short-term on how to discharge them. Two things follow. Firstly, since the costs that result 
from these constraints stem from contingent, discriminatory in-group favouritism by current 
citizens, the costs count less than their impact on redistribution may otherwise have implied. 
Secondly, they also give rise to dynamic duties. Governments accordingly have a responsibility to 
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implement policies that will strengthen trust and solidarity in diverse societies in the long-term 
and thereby reduce the impact of these motivational constraints. Such policies may include, for 
example, having robust and fair, non-discriminatory, institutions, provide equal opportunities for 
the disadvantaged who may otherwise be inclined to blame immigration and design the welfare 
state in ways that increase solidarity (cf. Rothstein, 2011).  
Such dynamic duties are often forgotten in discussions on the relation between immigration and 
the welfare state. In an argument for the legitimacy of prioritising domestic welfare over open 
borders, James Woodward (1992: 79) suggests that µ>«@LWGRHVVHHPXQFRQWURYHUVLDOWKDWfacts 
about non-ideal behaviour and institutions are relevant to and will make some difference for the 
obligations of citizens in affluent countries.¶ %XW :RRGZDUG¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW HYHQ QRQ-ideal 
institutions give rise to obligations that prioritise the welfare of members (citizens) of those unjust 
institutions over those who are affected by their injustice (potential immigrants), neglects that by 
allowing non-ideal behaviour and institutions to affect obligations it may become even harder to 
make that behaviour and those institutions more ideal in the long-term. This is why dynamic duties 
must also include the duty to consider how sequences of actions to mitigate the effect of soft 
constraints in the short-term impact what is feasible in long-term. It is not permissible to mitigate 
a soft constraint in the short-term in such a way as to make it more likely that this soft constraint 
will remain in the long-term. Motivational constraints, to the extent that they are real in the world 
right now, may count as low costs of refugee admission as they impact on other legitimate goals 
and they also carry a concomitant obligation to work towards reducing their impact. And 
importantly, even though such constraints may count as low costs for the way duties are 
discharged, allowing motivational constrains to count may not be permissible if in doing so, soft 
constraints are even more entrenched. Doing so would entail a failure to discharge dynamic duties.  
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Conclusion 
Affluent states persistently try to eschew their responsibilities to refugees by pursuing 
extraterritorial policies. This paper has considered when and how such policies may nonetheless 
be permissible. I argue that states may be permitted to limit the number of refugees they admit if 
they compensate by contributing to protection extraterritorially. However, this is only permissible 
under two conditions. These conditions are a) that protection in a third country must allow refugees 
to integrate, and b) protection in a third country must be based on bilateral or multilateral 
agreements. The first condition is particularly demanding and disqualifies many if not most of 
current extraterritorial practices, which often fail to even protect basic rights. This sets this paper 
apart from a recent attempt to theorise extraterritorial protection, where the authors argue that 
states can contribute to extraterritorial protection that falls short of integration in a new society as 
an alternative to admission (Betts and Collier, 2017).  
To concretise the relationship between costs, limits and obligations, this paper has explored what 
costs refugee admission may incur on states in the areas of self-determination and equality that 
may permit states to limit admission in favour of extraterritorial contributions. I concluded that 
refugee admission may incur costs, but that these tend to be of a lower kind since they are caused 
by controllable factors such as the institutional framework of the state or the attitudes of its citizens. 
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1
 Under strictly ideal conditions, no refugees would exist, but when they do it would be more ideal if all states 
fulfilled their duties towards refugees. Thus, ZKHQ,UHIHUWRµQRQ-LGHDOFRQGLWLRQV¶WKHTXDVLLGHDOZRUOGWKDWWKLVLV
measured against is not one where there are no refugees, but one in which all states fulfil their duties to refugees.  
2
 This is not to deny that many refugees do manage, despite the adverse conditions and limits to their rights, to create 
meaningful lives in refugee camps. 
3
 6RPHPD\DUJXHWKDWWKLVQRWLRQRIUHIXJHHSURWHFWLRQLPSOLHVWKDWUHIXJHHGHILQLWLRQVPXVWEHµQDUURZ¶, including 
for example only those who are persecuted, and not those generally deprived of human rights. Matthew Lister 
(2013) and Max Cherem (2016) pursue variations of this argument. This paper is not concerned with the definition 
of refugees, but I note WKDWP\DUJXPHQWGRHVQRWYDOLGDWH/LVWHU¶VDQG&KHUHP¶VSRVLWLRQEXWLWLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWK
it. That is, to them, extensive notions of protection imply that refugee definitions must be narrow, yet others may 
disagree that this is so whilst agreeing with my notion of refugee protection.  
4
 Although eventually, refugees will make claims to µmaker freedom¶ too, in their new state.  
5
 In addition, we should distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate means of instilling affirmation of political 
institutions amongst the citizenry, as well as between necessary and sufficient conditions. Affirmation may be 
SURGXFHGWKURXJKLQGRFWULQDWLRQEXWWKLVZRXOGQRWLQFUHDVHµPDNHUIUHHGRP¶DVLWZRXOGEHEDVHGRQPDQLSXODWLRQ
Authorship of political institutions is also not a sufficient condition to generate affirmation. 
6
 It should be clarified that this does not amount to a demand on refugees to understand themselves in a particular 
ZD\LQUHODWLRQWRWKHKRVWLQJVWDWH¶VSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRns in order for them to be able to claim their rights of 
protection, just as there are no conditions on citizens of a state to identify in a certain way in order to claim their 
rights as citizens.  
7
 Although as part of the EU/Turkey deal, Turkey has started to provide refugees with work permits. 
8
 Of course, refugees may also bring benefits in terms of for example tax payments and entrepreneurship and this 
needs to be taken into account too.  
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